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AGENCY
JAMES F. DREHER *
The only case decided by our Supreme Court during the re-
view period in which a point of law not theretofore decided
by the Court was enunciated was Mackey v. Frazier,' in which
the Court held, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Moss, that a judg-
ment in favor of a master, sued solely for the delicts of his
servant, is a bar to a subsequent action against the servant.
Williams had sued Mackey for property damage sustained
by his truck which had been in a collision with Mackey's
automobile at a time when, according to both the complaint
and the answer, Williams' truck had been operated by Frazier
as Williams' servant and agent. Mackey counterclaimed
against Williams for personal injuries and property damage,
alleging negligent and wilful conduct on the part of Frazier
as Williams' servant. The case was tried and Williams ob-
tained a judgment for $476.21 against Mackey and Mackey
paid it.
Mackey thereafter brought the present case against Frazier
and the allegations of negligence against him were verbatim
those which he had asserted in his counterclaim against Wil-
liams. Frazier moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the
ground that the former adjudication was a bar to the action.
Judge Littlejohn overruled the motion but his order was re-
versed by the Supreme Court.
The Court held that, although unquestionably2 a servant
who is guilty of negligent conduct toward a third person is
liable therefor, whether the master is or not, the doctrine of
estoppel by judgment barred the action against the servant
in the present case. Judge Moss soundly defines the doctrine
of estoppel by judgment as:
The principle that one person shall not a second time
litigate, with the same person or with another so identi-
*Member of the firm of Robinson, McFadden & Dreher, Columbia;
A.B., 1931, The Citadel; LL.B., 1934, University of South Carolina; part
time Instructor, University of South Carolina School of Law, 1946-54;
member Richland County, South Carolina and American Bar Associa-
tions.
1. 234 S. C. 81, 106 S. E. 2d 895 (1959).
2. Bell v. Clinton Oil Mill, 129 S. C. 242, 124 S. E. 7 (1924).
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fied in interest with such person that he represents the
same legal right, precisely the same question, particular
controversy, or issue which has been necessarily tried and
finally determined, upon its merits by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, in a judgment in peisonam in a for-
mer suit.
The doctrine was held applicable to the present case inasmuch
as, according to the court, the master and servant were so
identified in interest with each other that they represented the
same legal right.
The decision of the Supreme Court seems to be in accord
with precedent and sound reasoning. In dealing with the op-
posite situation where a master is sought to be held for the
tort of a servant after a judgment for or against the servant,
the Restatement 3 says:
If the claim against the principal is based wholly on
the rules of respondeat superior, a prior judgment for
the agent normally terminates the principal's liability,
and a judgment against the agent limits it.
Section 359B of the Restatement of Agency states that the
effect upon the liability of the agent of a judgment by or
against the principal is governed by the same rule.
The case of Brown v. National Oil Company4 was concerned
with the somewhat similar question of when a judgment
against a master alone can be sustained when he and his ser-
vant were sued. The case involved a flash fire which broke
out at the filling station of the plaintiff's intestate and caused
his death. The fire started while a gasoline storage tank was
being filled by the oil company's truck driver, one Taylor.
The oil company and Taylor had been sued jointly but the
jury's verdict against the oil company alone absolved Taylor
and left the question of whether the plaintiff had proved any
negligence against the oil company alone; the court accepting
it as settled law that where a master and servant are sued
jointly and the only evidence of negligence relates to acts
committed by the servant and the verdict of the jury exon-
erates the latter, a verdict against the master alone cannot
stand.5
3. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (2d ed.) § 217a, comment on clause (b).
4. 233 S. C. 345, 105 S. E. 2d 81 (1958).
5. LeGette v. Carolina Butane Gas Co., 210 S. C. 542, 43 S. E. 2d 472
(1947) and cases cited.
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In an opinion by Mr. Justice Oxner, the Court held that the
verdict against the oil company could stand inasmuch as there
was some evidence that the underground tank which was be-
ing filled had been improperly vented. Even accepting that
conclusion, the Court had still for decision the more difficult
question of whether the acts of a third party in striking a
match and later pulling the hose away from the filler pipe
were such intervening causes as to break the chain of causa-
tion. This question was also resolved in favor of the jury's
verdict and the judgment sustained.
The agency question in Fochtman v. Clanton's Auto Sales6
came in by the back door. The plaintiff sued Clanton for stop-
ping payment on two checks given him as the purchase price
of an automobile sold at Clanton's well known auction sale in
Darlington County. Clanton pleaded by way of justification
that six weeks earlier one Barker, an alleged agent of the
plaintiff, had purchased an automobile at the auction and
given a worthless check for it. The plaintiff denied that
Barker was acting as his agent at the time so the primary
question before the Supreme Court was whether Judge Little-
john had properly submitted to the jury the question of
whether Barker on the earlier occasion was acting under "ap-
parent authority" for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Taylor, in reliance upon authorities
dealing with both apparent authority and the allied principle
of equitable estoppel7 held that the issue was properly for
the jury and had been submitted by Judge Littlejohn under an
appropriate charge.
During the review period the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided one South Carolina case, Burger Brew-
ing Co. v. Summer,8 in the field of Agency. The holding was
simply to the effect that under South Carolina law an agency
of no fixed duration may be terminated by the principal at
any time without previous notice, unless the agent has devoted
to the achievement of the aims of the agency a substantial
consideration beyond his services. It seems to the writer that
the plaintiff made a rather strong case that he had expended
substantial considerations beyond his agency service in the
6. 233 S. C. 581, 106 S. E. 2d 272 (1958).
7. Mortgage and Acceptance Corporation v. Stewart, 142 S. C. 375, 140
S. E. 804 (1927); Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Ledford, 194 S. C.
347, 9 S. E. 2d 804 (1940).
8. 261 F. 2d 261 (4th Cir. 1958).
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development of his beer distributorship for Burger, but the
Court of Appeals, in an opinion by District Judge Bryan, held
to the contrary and reversed the judgement which Judge Tim-
merman had allowed to be entered for the plaintiff.
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